Dictator Indira Gandhi's despotic regime found this cartoon by Abu Abraham in Indian Express not fit for publication as it was critical of her censorship. Cartoon was CENSORED. See the rejection stamp.
One MAN Government.
श्रमेव-जयते or Shram-eva-Jayate was another slogan then. Indira Gandhi's stooges colleagues labored hard.
One of the outputs generated from Dictator Indira Gandhi's propaganda machine: Price of Liberty Indian people had to pay.
Dictator Indira Gandhi had ministerial colleagues during dark days of Emergency who all resembled this.
Frontpage of Indian Herald Newspaper when Emergency (Darkest days of Indian Democracy) was enforced by Indira Gandhi & Indian National Congress and opposition including great stalwart Indian leaders like Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Lal Krishna Advani, et al, the then opposition, were thrown in jail.
Frontpage of The Hindu Newspaper when Emergency (Darkest days of Indian Democracy) was enforced by Indira Gandhi & Indian National Congress and press censorship was imposed.
Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) leading people to Parliament Street against Emergency.
All vacant sites of outdoor media and billboards had to display such dictatorial messages.
* Suspension of Fundamental Rights
* Article 14 – Right to Equality before Law
* Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty
* Article 22 – Protection against Arrest and Detention in certain cases
* Gain of extraordinary power
* 39 th Amendment – Made proclamation of Emergency non-justiciable
* 40 th Amendment – Courts prevented from hearing against President, PM, Speaker
* 41 st Amendment – Conferred immunity to PM against criminal proceedings in just about every conceivable case
* 42 nd Amendment – Authorised President to amend Constitution for 2 years
* Abolished the need for quorum in Parliament (2/3 could make laws for India!)
These documents "Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972" were released by Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State on June 28, 2005.
As per the Press Release,
For the period January 1969 to February 1971 and all of 1972, the e-volume released today provides full coverage of U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the newly created state of Bangladesh. The e-volume also contains documentation that supplements the print volume XI. These additional documents on India and Pakistan for the period March to December 1971 include intelligence assessments, key messages from the U.S. Embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi and the Consulate General in Dacca, responses to National Security Study Memoranda, and full transcripts of Presidential tape recordings that are summarized and excerpted in editorial notes in volume XI."Indira was a bitch to Nixon" by Chidanand Rajghatta on July 1, 2005
Even before the "tilt" toward Pakistan during the war, the Nixon administration concluded that peace and stability in South Asia could only be maintained by aiding Pakistan against a stronger India that was receiving military aid from the Soviet Union. In addition, Pakistan was serving as a secret conduit on behalf of Nixon and Kissinger in their attempts to open contacts with the People's Republic of China. A major theme of this e-volume is the Nixon administration's policy of so-called one-time only exceptions of arms sales to Pakistan, a policy that reversed the Johnson administration's moratorium on lethal military sales to both countries after the 1965 war. When, over the objections of Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon released for sale to Pakistan 100 U.S. tanks (formerly the property of Turkish armed forces), U.S.-Indian relations, which had not been good, deteriorated even further. India responded by closing some United States Information Service (USIS) cultural centers.
After its supplemental coverage of the conclusion of the 1971 war, the major theme of the e-volume is the U.S. adjustment to a new balance of power in South Asia. The Nixon administration offered substantial economic aid and limited military aid to Pakistan under its new civilian president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan did not consider the military aid sufficient, but relations between Pakistan and the United States were generally good. U.S. relations with India showed some improvement, as Washington responded cautiously to overtures from India for better bilateral relations. There was, however, the realization among the U.S. intelligence community and the Washington bureaucracy that India had a growing potential for producing nuclear weapons.
The United States may be cooing and billing over India now, but just 35 years ago, its President and National Security Advisor corrosively called then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a bitch and a witch, felt Indians were sanctimonious and hypocritical bastards, and wished India would be struck by a famine and lose badly in a war.
The dramatis personae in some of the most toxic exchanges are Richard Nixon, a coarse and foul-mouthed Republican president who was left office in disgrace after being impeached in the Watergate scandal, and his sidekick Henry Kissinger, a great votary of Indo-U.S ties today, who some regard as the greatest war criminal alive.
The scene is the winter of 1971 when a military dictatorship in Pakistan has unleashed a brutal genocide in the eastern wing of the country, raping, looting and killing its Hindu minorities and intellectuals on a scale that makes today's excesses in the region look like a picnic. Although U.S diplomats in Dhaka sent frantic cables chronicling the brutalities, Nixon's only concern is how to protect Pakistan and its dictator Yahya Khan against a country which he feels is too close to the Soviet Union and has been ungrateful to the United States.
They also discuss manipulating public opinion and trash American diplomats who they see as sympathetic to the Indian plight of handling millions of refugees streaming into West Bengal from then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
In later conversations, Nixon and Kissinger call Keating a bastard, a traitor, and a weak son of a bitch. Pakistan's military dictator Yahya Khan, who was responsible for the slaughter of more than a million Bangladeshis is, in Nixon's words ''a decent, honorable man.''
Nixon-Kissinger's views about the then US Ambassador to Bharat (misnomer: India) Mr. Kenneth Barnard Keating were not that respectful either and they also ridiculed Bharat's security concerns which were being echoed by Mr. Keating in those times.
150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Chief of Staff (Haldeman), Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:15-9:00 a.m.
Nixon: This is just the point when she is a bitch.
Kissinger: Well, the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there. It's—to them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how she carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan.
Nixon: I think I'll make the meeting today a rather brief—cool. [unclear] I don't mean by that cool in terms of not trying to bring up [unclear] I'll talk to her a little about Vietnam, and-
Kissinger: I'd let her talk a little more, maybe today—
Kissinger: —to be a little less forthcoming. But basically, Mr. President—
Nixon: So I was trying to give her no excuses. Now I've talked to her, told her everything we're going to do. Now it's up to her.
Kissinger: While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. You very subtly—I mean, she will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn't give her a warm reception and therefore, in despair, she's got to go to war.
Kissinger: So her objective—she has a right to be a little sore because you thwarted her objective. She would rather have had you give her a cool reception—
Nixon: That's right.
Kissinger: —so that she could say that she was really put upon.
Nixon: Oh, we really—
Nixon: We really slobbered over the old witch.
Kissinger: How you slobbered over her in things that did not matter, but in the things that did matter—
Kissinger: —you didn't give her an inch. So that she's—
Nixon: She knows.
Kissinger: She knows she isn't coming out of here with any—she can't go home and say, "The president promised to do the following for me," and then when you don't do it—
Nixon: Did you get across with that clown yesterday afternoon at 5:00? You went on the, that as far as the, as she was concerned that she would consider letting him—
Nixon: —consult with regard to the designation. We want to be sure he understood that was the situation.
Kissinger: Right, and I fixed it in the memorandum of conversation which I'm giving him in such a way that it—just a little. I've made it a little more explicit.
Nixon: Now you've covered Rogers for long enough—
Kissinger: Oh yeah, Rogers is in good shape.
Nixon: He's prepared to be told this?
Kissinger: Oh yes. They've apparently treated him personally in a way that he doesn't like, so he's very—
Kissinger: No, no. He'll be very tough with them.
Nixon: Yeah, he's likely to be sharper with them than I was, you know. He can do that [unclear].
Kissinger: Well, he will be personally sharper but he doesn't like her. In substance he won't be as tough as you—
Nixon: He's likely [unclear].
Kissinger: —because he doesn't know the subject so well. I mean the skill—
Nixon: You should have heard, Bob, the way we worked her around. I dropped stilettos all over her. It's like, you know—
Kissinger: She didn't know [unclear exchange] about the guerrillas in East Pakistan. [unclear]. One thing that really struck me, the blown up [unclear] and that takes a lot of technical training. I wonder where they got that.
Nixon: She [unclear] so fast.
Kissinger: She said the East Bengal rifles [unclear-used to?]. That's where it came from.
Nixon: That's right. We also stuck it to her on that book—Henry's book about India-Pakistan.
Kissinger: She said she studied a lot about the problems—how these conflicts started. Read a book by Maxwell, called India-China War, which is a book that in effect proves that India started the '62 War. It was done with an enormous politeness and courtesy and warmth.
Nixon: Well I acted as if I didn't know what the hell had happened—
Nixon: —so she couldn't say anything. But she knew goddamn well that I knew what happened, don't you think?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. You stuck it to her about the press.
Nixon: On that I hit it hard.
Kissinger: And I told—
Nixon: I raised my voice a little.
Kissinger: And I told her assistant—I told my opposite number that the thing that is really striking to us is that last year Mrs. Gandhi, during her election campaign, made official protests that we were intervening when we weren't. And she never produced any proof. And yet every opposition candidate gets a royal reception, tremendous publicity, personal meetings. And then after you do all of this you come over here and ask us to solve all your problems.
Nixon: You told him that?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah.
Nixon: Good for you.
Kissinger: I said look at the record the last 3 months. You've had a press campaign against us. You put out the word that our relations are the worst ever. You get Kennedy over. You get that Congressman Gallagher over. You make a treaty with the Russians. And then you come here and say we have to solve your problems for you.
Nixon: Well if it was any—
Kissinger: But, Mr. President, even though she was a bitch, we shouldn't overlook the fact that we got what we wanted, which was we kept her from going out of here saying that the United States kicked her in the teeth. We've got the film clip of this; you've got the toast. You've got the general warmth that you generated in the personal meeting.
Nixon: I do think at dinner tonight [unclear].
Kissinger: You didn't give her a goddamn thing.
Kissinger: If you would have put on a Johnson performance, it would have been emotionally more satisfying but it would have hurt us. Because—I mean if you had been rough with her—
Kissinger: —then she'd be crying, going back crying to India. So I think even though she is a bitch, I'd be a shade cooler today, but—
Nixon: No, no. I mean, "cool" in terms of, like yesterday, as you noted, I tried to carry the conversation.
Kissinger: No, I'd let her carry it.
Nixon: And was sort of saying, "look, we're being as good as we can in dealing with Pakistan. What else can we do?" Today, I'm just going to say [unclear].
Kissinger: That's what I would do. Except for Vietnam, I'd give her 5 minutes of the Tito talk because it will go right back to the Russians as well as to the Vietnamese.
Nixon: Will it?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. They have the closest diplomatic ties now with Russia. They leak everything right back to them.
136. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42-9:51 a.m.Following is an excerpt from the telegram to various American Embassies. It informs of US's stand vis-a-vis Bharat and Pakistan conflict during that time. It also makes clear as to what does the then Nixon administration thought of Bharatvaasi. As per the telegram, Bhutto actually wanted reconciliation with Bharat but had some constraints for which he wanted US to put pressure on Bharat.
Nixon: I told Keating that I would see him—he was there last night at this little party we had—and I told him I would see him when he came back, late and in the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I think we'll just have him for a half hour and then have him—
Kissinger: I saw him leaving.
Nixon: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to be sure we don't get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way or another, so forth and so on.
Kissinger: He's almost fanatical on this issue.
Nixon: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it?
Kissinger: Oh he thinks—I tell you, he thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out of—
Nixon: Push—I don't want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing with me.
Kissinger: Mr. President, actually we've got to keep Yahya, we have to keep Yahya [unclear] public executions for the next month.
Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn't do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador who goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the—
Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It's going be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia—
Kissinger: No resources. They're going to become a ripe field for Communist infiltration. And then they're going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta. That they may have in the back of their mind.
Nixon: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan.
TELEGRAMIn this conversation Nixon calls Bharatvaasi hypocrites and sanctimonious.
ACTION Amembassy ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI
USUN NEW YORK Amembassy LONDON Amembassy MOSCOW Amembassy TEHRAN Amembassy PARIS
Deliver opening of Business Dec. 19.
SUBJECT: Secretary's Conversation with Bhutto
1. Following is uncleared Memcon, FYI, and subject to revision upon review.
2. Pak Deputy PM-designate, Z. A. Bhutto, called on Secretary December 18 prior to call on President. Bhutto accompanied by Ambassador Raza. Sisco and Laingen sat in. Bhutto expressed deep appreciation that US had stood by Pakistan in defense QUOTE basic principles international law and civilized society UNQUOTE, indicated strong concern over Soviet policies in achieving QUOTE reversal of Cubas at Pakistan's cost UNQUOTE, and pledged determination seek reconciliation with India. Essential, however, that Indian forces leave East Pakistan promptly; said he thought it still possible preserve Pak unity on basis very loose confederation. In any event effort must be made and he was returning to Pakistan forthwith not to rock boat but to do what he could in context transfer of political power which now vital and urgent. Secretary stressed strong USG support for Pakistan, understanding for severe problems ahead, and intention continue be as helpful as possible. Assured Bhutto we would consult closely before any action re Bangla Desh but noted likelihood we would need and wish to support international humanitarian relief that area.
(Continued next page)
3. Secretary gave Bhutto warm welcome, emphasizing our understanding that this was sad time in history Pakistan and that we very pleased to get Bhutto's views directly regarding future and what we can do together to be helpful. Noted we have tried to do what we could to help in current crisis and that president particularly was understanding and sympathetic on basis certain basic principles and was looking forward to meeting Bhutto later in day.
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6. Second fundamental point was that he and Pakistani people were. prepared for reconciliation with India. India now has glorious opportunity either to seek reconciliation with Pakistan or become enemy of Pakistan, for all time on scale like Carthage and Rome. If India
missed present opportunity, there would be hatred for all time, utter chaos and terrible massacre. He shuddered to think what this could mean for Muslims in Bengal. Moreover, this hatred would spread to whole subcontinent: India must act with magnanimity. Honorable adjustments between two countries could be made but these could not be made in vacuum and would require time.
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11. Secretary took note of Bhutto's hope India would act with magnanimity but noted that despite capacity of Indians often to appear magnanimous publicly and on the record, they could be very sanctimonious and self-righteous and act quite differently privately. Bhutto concurred and said it most Important for this reason that USG not lose current political initiative. US should make clear to India that it had treaty relationship with Pakistan and that it was not going to fold up its carpets and leave." India should also be made to understand from US that latter giving serious consideration to massive economic assistance and considering military assistance in order to restore strategic balance in South Asia. Indians must understand from US that it has major global interests that have been adversely affected by recent Soviet action South Asia and that it would take these into account in seeking long-term permanent settlement. Indians should also hear from US that they could not do one thing in East Pakistan and something else in Kashmir. Indians had used force in East Pakistan but what of Kashmir?
12. These were things that USG should now be telling. India. Whether USG could in fact provide military and economic aid now was not so important. (He aware of public opinion trends in US.) USG and GOP could talk about such things later; important thing was that India should have clear understanding that we considering such action. Secretary commented that India should also understand that accom plishing secession of a neighboring state by force was dangerous principle with widespread consequences. Bhutto agreed,saying this was dangerous Pandora's box.
13. Secretary observed that he hoped that Bhutto understood that USG would be under strong pressure public opinion to continue involve itself
actively in humanitarian relief actions in Bangla Desh. Bhutto said he understood this but hoped it would be done in way that would not imply recognition and would not complicate GOP's negotiating stance on future of East Pakistan.
14. In response questions by Secretary and Sisco re future evolution East-West Pakistan relations, Bhutto said Pakistan ready and willing negotiate new arrangement, It was important, however, that this be done by people of Pakistan and that there must be withdrawal Indian forces.
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15. Secretary asked what basic stance Bhutto thought USG should take toward East Pakistan. Bhutto's response was that US could not be unfriendly to 70 million people These people would be heavily dependent on USG since India could obviously do little to help them and only US could Promise "hope." In response specific query from Secretary, Bhutto said hem. convinced that confederation on "very loose
basis" would have been possible in past between East and West Pakistan; he could not say with certainty whether this now possible but it was important that people of Pakistan be allowed to make an effort to accomplish, this. Tragically, what had now happened had set back development in East Pakistan by fifty years. India could do nothing to help in this respect.
16. Bhutto said Mrs. Gandhi now faced dangerous situation. She had laid basis for "Bangla Deshes allover Subcontinent." (At separate point, referred to "bug of secession" that could spread very fast in-West Pakistan if previous balance -between East and West not present.) Said Mrs. Gandhi would rue the day she had "gone to bed with Soviet bear."[Emphasis added] Soviets had no humanitarian instincts at all.
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Nixon: The Indians did insist there's this, and, you know, they're hypocrites and sanctimonious about this. Now there's no question that Yahya has handled it really in a stupid way. I mean, and the only way you would expect in [with?] all the military backing. He's a very decent man, but it's just been handled badly. And in any case that the country is inevitable, as it's inevitable this country will tear part, come apart. But the Indians, the Indians are playing—I'm afraid from all reports, they're playing a game here that I think is wrong. I think they're deliberately trying to make it insoluble. And if it becomes insoluble what happens? Well, what happens is you have India, which can't even digest what they already have, probably—how the hell are they going to run that place? The other thing is that there is the danger, and there is the danger that a West Pakistani with a suicidal attitude will decide to have a fight.This is a talk between the then US Secretary and the then Pakistani Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed in which US Secretary wishes that Bharat looses the war and that too badly. This conversation is just amazing. It shows how far apart Bharat and US stood under Dictator Indira Nehru Gandhi and compare it to how close they are today because of relentless efforts of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's BJP led NDA Government (1998-2004).
Douglas-Home: Through Kashmir?
Kissinger: We've had an intelligence report today—I don't know that [unclear]—Well, that they're thinking of going into Kashmir because this situation, as the Foreign Secretary is pointing out, is getting unmanageable.
Nixon: What can we do? What can be done?
DEPARTMENT OF STATEFor more documents on US policy on Bharat-Pakistan crisis in 1971 please go to "India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971".
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: September 30, 1974
TIME: 4:30 p.m.
SUBJECT: The Call of the Pakistani Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed on the Secretary
Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed
Ambassador Sahabzada Yaqub Khan
Minister-Counselor Iqbal Riza
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
Robert Oakley, NSC
Peter D. Constable, NEA/PAB (Notetaker)
DISTRIBUTION: S; S/S; WH (General Scowcroft)
THE SECRETARY: I am pleased to see you. I look forward to my visit to Pakistan at the end of the month.
AZIZ AHMED: We are looking forward to your visit too. It will be a very short visit, but I don't blame you. I know you are very hard-pressed. It is remarkable how much you can do.
THE SECRETARY: I am very pressed for time. My program is the same in each country except for an extra day in India. I have never been there before as Secretary of State. I have had a telegram from Ambassador Byroade conveying some concerns about my visit to India. We would like to move the Indians away from the Soviets. But we are not engaging in a reorientation of our foreign policy. You must not be rattled by our moves with India.
AZIZ AHMED: I had a call from Prime Minister Bhutto yesterday and he asked me to convey some thoughts to you. He was concerned by reports that you had said there was a dramatic improvement in relations between the U.S. and India, and that all differences had been resolved.
THE SECRETARY: I said there had been an improvement in relations and that is substantially true, although it is not so much from what we are doing. We want to move them away from the Soviets. But we would never tolerate military aggression against Pakistan.
AZIZ AHMED: The Prime Minister also asked me to remind you of what you said in 1971, that you would teach them a lesson they would never forget. Now I know that positions change and that policies evolve. THE SECRETARY: Well, in practice, they are coming to us.
AZIZ AHMED: But the reverse impression has been created. The Weintraub article in the New York Times indicated that the U. S. is seeking ways to give aid to India...
THE SECRETARY: I have seen that article. We have a budding novelist in our Embassy. He is busy writing chapters for his book. We are not eager to give aid to India and I would be amazed if Congress appropriated any. It was obvious that someone was talking to Embassy people. It is a classic example of masochism. We have to prove ourselves to the Indians. Even the Indians would not be so insolent as to demand that. It is an American masochistic sense of guilt that we must perform a national duty by giving aid to India. We want to create an impression and maybe the reality of greater Indian independence. We want the Soviets to understand that they get no permenent advantage anywhere when they touch something. We have no illusions about Indian policy, but their and our purposes may be served by the illusion of better relations. There are also domestic advantages in this. Internationally there is no significance, no real change.
AZIZ AHMED: If I may say so, this is an old story. Twelve years ago we were told that you had to have better relations with India to prevent it from having closer relations with the Soviets. We think there is another way. You have to prove to the Indians the futility of arming themselves. This can only be demonstrated by indicating specifically what the U.S. will do in the event of an attack on Pakistan. This can also be demonstrated by supplying sophisticated arms to Pakistan. Then the Indians will realize it is futile to build up its arms.
THE SECRETARY: My going to India makes it easier to do something for Pakistan. Our problem is... It is essential that you see the President while you are here. He has already seen Swaran Singh.
AZIZ AHMED: There is another aspect. The prospect of better Sino-Indian relations.
THE SECRETARY: We favor that, but the Indian action in Sikkim does not help.
AZIZ AHMED: The Chinese have told us that if the Indians implement their agreement with us and Pakistan is satisfied, China will improve its relations with India. When we were in Peking, the Deputy Prime Minister said publicly at the banquet that China was ready for close and friendly relations with India. A week later - the bomb. That was a setback. And now Sikkim. Nepal and Bhutan are worried. Nepal is terribly worried. China is going to see that nothing happens to Nepal or Bhutan.
THE SECRETARY: We have no great illusions about India. Perhaps that is the difference from 12 years ago. For us, the arms question is not an intellectual problem. In 1971 I did not understand how people in this government interpreted the President's orders on third-country transfers when we imposed the embargo on Pakistan. No one explained to me that it would hurt Pakistan more than India. The Government was pro-Pakistan at that time, but the bureaucracy was pro-India. To some extent that has changed now with the Indian bomb. The bureaucracy is anti-proliferation. My people will do anything but run foreign policy. I am less outraged by the Indian bomb than some. I see it as a trap for India. They will never be able to use it in practice. And if the bomb spreads, it will equalize India's military superiority.
AZIZ AHMED: The French say the same thing but I do not agree. If the Indian army were in difficulty they would use the nuclear bomb in desperation as a last resort.
THE SECRETARY: They would lose the war first and very badly in my opinion. Will you beat them?
AZIZ AHMED: We can if we have arms. But we're not planning to do that. We just want enough to defend ourselves against India and Afghanistan who are being supported by the Soviet Union.
THE SECRETARY: I have seen figures on the Afghanistan buildup. After elections I'll raise the arms question again. And you raise it when you see the President. [The Secretary then suggested to Mr. Oakley that the meeting with the President be arranged for Saturday, October 5.] It will be better if I am there.
AZIZ AHMED: For the last three years we have been left to fend for ourselves.
THE SECRETARY: I know. I am beginning to despair about domestic attitudes. Congress is now attacking Turkey, another ally. However, the mood is shifting on India.
AZIZ AHMED: What about the mood on arms for Pakistan?
THE SECRETARY: As I told you the last time that we met, we will work on the cash sales first. But there will be a massive problem. Somebody leaks even our internal papers on this. This is a happy little group.
AZIZ AHMED: When it happens, there will be a big noise from the Indians.
THE SECRETARY: Are you buying from the French?
AZIZ AHMED: We are buying some missiles, but the French are holding back deliveries for two to four years. Unfortunately I was here when the agreement was signed. We want them now, not in two to four years. The French are slick businessmen, they keep pushing us back. Our negotiators quietly accepted their terms.
THE SECRETARY: I know of no Pakistani who quietly accepts reverses. Someone asked me how many Pakistanis would be able to carry out the mediation in Cyprus. I said you would be able to do it, and you are welcome to take over. But I would advise you to stay out. I'd like to get out. The Greeks have a new formula for negotiations: riots, attack me in the press and then invite me in. I said I would wait two more weeks.
AZIZ AHMED: The Greeks invited Prime Minister Bhutto to mediate and then posed unacceptable conditions for a settlement. We bought three Breguet-Atlantique aircraft from the French. If we had had them in 1971, we could have destroyed the Indian OSA's which attacked Karachi in the middle of the night. The French gave us half-price on the aircraft - 38 million francs - but with the service and modifications the total price was 220 million francs. They are not only fleecing us, but also skinning us. The Croatale missiles increased from 200 to 350 million francs by the time we reached agreement. They know we have nowhere else to go and they exploit us.
THE SECRETARY: How about Iran?
AZIZ AHMED: We don't know. They have offered to help us in the dieselization of our tanks.
THE SECRETARY: Yes. We helped on that.
AZIZ AHMED: We have suggested to the Iranians cross-training of our people on their equipment, but they are reluctant on that. We have had no training on their equipment.
THE SECRETARY: Would you like me to raise that with the Shah?
AZIZ AHMED: No. We don't want him to know that we complained. He has been very good to us.
THE SECRETARY: Why not? I will see him alone on my trip. We have a very good relationship.
AZIZ AHMED: If war, God forbid, should come, we only want equipment from Iran, not troops. The Shah talks in sweeping terms of support, but we don't know specifically what it would be.
THE SECRETARY: Even against Afghanistan?
AZIZ AHMED: Yes, against Afghanistan. The most we could hope for would be the transfer of equipment if we saw war coming.
THE SECRETARY: Their Air Force could help.
AZIZ AHMED: We would only want their equipment but that requires training.
THE SECRETARY: Let me talk to the Shah. What are you doing on the Cambodian Resolution?
AZIZ AHMED: What is it?
THE SECRETARY: One resolution would expel the Cambodians. We want deferral of the issue for one year.
AZIZ AHMED: We will look into it, with your views in mind.
THE SECRETARY: How is the Prime Minister?
AZIZ AHMED: Fine. He has been touring the northern areas. We picked up Hunza, but there is no change in our stand on Jammu and Kashmir. Hunza will be a directly administered area. We could not leave it with the Mir of Hunza. On another matter I want to bring up. In spite of the promises made by oil producers, we have not had much help. They say that balance of payments assistance is against their policy. The Saudis have provided $100 million in loans for four projects - $50 million now and the rest in two years. Our oil deficit is $200 million. We have $150 million in a loan from Iran and will get another $50 million from the Saudis. We are even on the deficit, but this increases our debt and we will have problems in years ahead. We are in difficulty on wheat and vegetable oil. We appreciate your problems.
THE SECRETARY: Have any arrangements been made for wheat for Pakistan?
MR. ATHERTON: We have made recommendation for the second quarter but no action has been taken as yet.
AZIZ AHMED: The word is around that Pakistan is better off than India or Bangladesh and that Pakistan is not the most severely hit. Well, we are better off than India and Bangladesh, but not so well off as to get nothing. We have a difficult problem with wheat. We had hoped to be even this year, but because of bad weather and too optimistic forecasting, we find we have a deficit of 1.1 million tons.
THE SECRETARY: We insist on a high priority for Pakistan in our internal discussions on food assistance. We have lots of problems with other departments, with Agriculture which wants a medium-sized allocation, and OMB which wants a low allocation. There is concern over the effect on our food prices. But I hope we will have a decision on the second quarter before you come down to see the President. We will be sympathetic. We will not be able to give you all you want, but we will be very sympathetic. We'll let you know.
AZIZ AHMED: We have imported 650,000 tons from our own resources.
THE SECRETARY: On food we can't do everything but we'll do something. I saw Mujib today for the first time. He keeps talking about "my oil, my people, my food". He said he wants some assets from Pakistan.
AZIZ AHMED: When Bhutto visited Dacca, Mujib said he wanted immediate agreement on 56 percent of Pakistan's ships and planes. Bhutto told him he could not make an immediate decision, because he is accountable to his people in Parliament. Kamal Hossain talked to me later and forced me to say that when the liabilities and assets are counted, the balance may be against Bangladesh. I told him not to be too anxious for a full accounting.
THE SECRETARY: Mujib said he will explain the whole situation to me. I have never been to Dacca before. He wants you to take 67,000 families of Biharis.
AZIZ AHMED: Mujib's position is sheer cussedness and vindictiveness. I have been told by a diplomat in Bangladesh that it is extraordinary to see the jute mills running at half capacity, while outside the mills there are Biharis in camps. They won't employ them, even though they have the skills to run the mills.
THE SECRETARY: Why don't you want them?
AZIZ AHMED: We have debated this at length. The Sind already has a high proportion of non-Sindhis. There is a delicate political balance.
THE SECRETARY: Who are the non-Sindhis?
AZIZ AHMED: They are refugees from India. There was a massive move to Karachi at partition. We took 150,000 non-Bengalees and we tried to spread them around the country. But once they come, they drift to Karachi.
THE SECRETARY: Because the employment is there?
AZIZ AHMED: Yes. Mr. Bhutto says that he doesn't believe in provincialism, but he has to take it into account. He explained this to Mujib. We have offered to set up a commission on assets that would report its conclusions within six months. On the Biharis, after good relations are established and there is some movement in our relations, maybe the problem can be resolved quietly. But Mujib said no.
THE SECRETARY: I will see you in Washington and then later in Islamabad.
MR. ATHERTON: The press may want to know after this meeting what you have discussed.
THE SECRETARY: Say that we had very warm talks.
AZIZ AHMED: Can you say "in the context of our special relationship"?
THE SECRETARY: Let us say that we had warm talks in the context of our very special friendship.
AZIZ AHMED: That's fine.
THE SECRETARY: We are very conscious of your needs on arms. On food we will try to move very fast.
For more official information about President Nixon's views about Bharat please go to "Second Chronological Conversation Tape Release" and its home page.
You can also listen to Nixon's White House tapes online. Here is one of the Tape Conversation Number 624-21 on November 24, 1971. Its official abstract is
"The President, Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers change the US government policy of neutrality in the India-Pakistan War and secretly "tilt" toward Pakistan."The Nixon Library has almost 50 million pages of documents and is working toward making more of this massive collection available to the researcher via the Internet. Here are some of the Documents online.
Some of the important Tape Subject Logs for the above mentioned important conversations including the ones in which Nixon-Kissinger abused Bharatvaasi and Indira Nehru Gandhi can be read online: Oval #583: September 29, 1971, Oval #615: November 5, 1971, Oval #615: November 5, 1971 and Oval #624: November 24, 1971.
You can also go to "White House Tapes Finding Aids" for more help.
This is how pseudo-secular Pro-Congress Muslim-Rightist section of Bharatiya media reported these revelations: Old witch Indira’ll go to war: Nixon-Kissinger by Indian Express on June 29, 2005