A Perfect Terrorist: Frontline PBS & ProPublica documentary on David Headley & 26/11

PBS FRONTLINE and ProPublica investigate the mysterious circumstances behind Pakistani-American Dawood Gilani aka David Coleman Headley's rise from heroin dealer and government informant in DEA to plotting the २६/११/२००८ terrorist attacks on Mumbai. Despite repeated warnings, how did Headley slip into India to scout targets? And how much did U.S. officials know about his relationship with terrorist group Lashkar-i-Taiba and ISI?

The American Behind The २००८ Attack On Mumbai on NPR Fresh Air with Terry Gross and ProPublica reporter Sebastian Rotella.

Please also read "Could This Man’s Warnings Have Prevented the Mumbai Attacks?"

FRONTLINE: A Perfect Terrorist

Chapter १ of ६

Watch A Perfect Terrorist on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Chapter २ of ६

Watch A Perfect Terrorist on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Chapter ३ of ६

Watch A Perfect Terrorist on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Chapter ४ of ६

Watch A Perfect Terrorist on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Chapter ५ of ६

Watch A Perfect Terrorist on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Chapter ६ of ६

Watch A Perfect Terrorist on PBS. See more from FRONTLINE.

Indian government's spineless stand on persecution of Hindu minorities in Pakistan

CONgress led Indian government hides behind Simla Agreement and refuses to protect Hindu minorities in Pakistan.

UNDER RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT

Central Public Information Officer

Prime Minister’s Office

South Block, NEW DELHI-110101

Sir

I will be obliged if your honour kindly provides me complete and detailed information on under-mentioned aspects together with related documents/correspondence/file-notings etc:

1. Approximate number of Pakistani nationals presently in the country whose visa-period has already expired. Please provide details according to years of overstay, if feasible
2. Approximate number of Bangladeshi nationals presently in the country whose visa-period has already expired. Please provide details according to years of overstay, if feasible
3. Approximate number of other foreign nationals presently in the country whose visa-period has already expired. Please provide details according to years of overstay, if feasible
4. Steps taken to send back Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals back to their countries whose visa-periods stand expired
5. Steps taken to send back other foreign nationals back to their countries whose visa-periods stand expired
6. Rules including punishment for over-stay or illegal stay of foreign-nationals in India
7. Is it true that many foreign-nations especially from countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh are living illegally in India entering India without any visa?
8. If yes, approximate number of such persons according to country of their origin and Indian states where such illegal migrants are living
9. Rules about nationality of children (having taken birth in India) of foreign nationals either residing in India illegally without obtained any visa, or over-staying on expired visa
10. Is it true that many Hindus and/or their families from Pakistan have come to India with a desire to get Indian citizenship?
11. If yes, approximate number of Hindus separately from Pakistan and Bangladesh who are over-staying or illegally living in India in anticipation of Indian citizenship
12. Rules to grant Indian citizenship to migrant Hindus from Pakistan and Bangladesh
13. Is India government aware of pitiable situation of minority Hindus living in Pakistan and Bangladesh with their percentage in population there fast declining?
14. If yes, steps taken if any, by Indian government to safeguard and protect rights of Hindu nationals of Pakistan and Bangladesh
15. Any other related information
16. File-notings/correspondence/documents etc every aspect of this RTI petition

In case queries relate to some other public-authority, please transfer this RTI petition to CPIO there under section 6(3) of RTI Act. Postal-order number 92E 298759 for rupees ten is enclosed towards RTI fees in name of “Accounts Officer” as per DoPT circular-number No.F.10/9/2008-IR dated 05.12.2008.

Regards

SUBHASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL

(Guinness Record Holder & RTI Activist)

1775 Kucha Lattushah

Dariba, Chandni Chowk

DELHI 110006 (India)

13.06.2011

Indian Government stand on persecution of Hindu minorities in Pakistan

BBC Documentary Oct 2011 - Secret Pakistan: "Double Cross USA"

BBC documentary Secret Pakistan: "Double Cross USA" about Pakistan ISI connections with Taliban and Haqqani Networks, to counter attack USA and NATO allies. From last 10 years, Pakistan covertly played the double cross game against USA in Afghanistan and sponsored Islamic terror against Bharat (Hindusthan/India).

Part 1: Double Cross



Part 2: Backlash

Manmohan Singh Surrenders with Musharraf-ishtyle Adaab

Look at this Musharraf wannabe Sellout
तुम मेरे नागरिक मारो और मैं तुम्हे आदाब के साथ आत्मसमर्पण करूंगा।
(You Terrorize & Mass murder my countrymen and I will Bow & Surrender to you)

No wonder his Muslim Rightist party's symbol is hand. वाह रे, Bharatiya Domestic-Foreign policy Tamasha. Someone is busy kissing enemy's a** internationally by doing Adaab, Musharraf-ishtyle, while someone else is busy domestically learning how to Hail (salute).

Its the same Pervez Musharraf who on the 10th Anniversary of Kargil war victory today, a fact which present Congress Government has chosen to ignore and families of those soldiers who died are being neglected, has just termed the war as a "big success" for Pakistan as it forced India to discuss Kashmir post-war in 1999. In an interview to a news channel he said, "Yes, indeed, it was a big success because it had (an) impact even on the attitudes of the Indian side. How did we start discussing the Kashmir dispute? How was it that the Indians agreed that we will discuss Kashmir and there must be a negotiated settlement? Before this there was no such thing at all,".

What a role model, Overrated World Renowned Mythical Economist and Dhimmi Regent Sellout PM Mr. Manmohan Singh has chosen.

It's for sure that someone was smoking a joint while writing that disastrous blunder of a joint statement because no sane nationalist & patriot Bharatvaasi will so as to even think of surrendering Bharat's sovereignty to an enemy which has mass murdered through terror so many Bharatiya citizens and persecuted its minorities particularly Hindus whose population has gone down from double digits to point decimal places. Sadly, articles below tell a different story. Credit for the articles goes to their respective fearless authors. In days when the Government may be arm twisting media houses or latter chooses to be a sellout and toe Government's line, such articles which bring out truth are need of the hour. Posting excerpts from them here before they get censored and removed from original source.

Manmohan Singh introduced Balochistan, terror delink in Egypt statement by Times Of India

Who drafted the controversial joint statement in Sharm-el Sheikh?

Sifting through the clutter, this is the picture that has been culled.

On July 14, foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon had his first official talks with his Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir.

Bashir handed over a paper that detailed the actions taken by Pakistan on the 26/11 terror attacks from January 5, the day India handed over its first dossier to Pakistan.

The talks continued through July 15, at various forums on the sidelines of the NAM summit, without much headway, except for a line here, a paragraph there. Menon even reportedly met Pakistan PM Yousuf Raza Gilani. The Indian side had travelled with a draft statement, but the problem was getting Pakistan to agree to it.

On July 16, when PM Manmohan Singh finally met Gilani, the two leaders sat down for a one-on-one chat that went on for a long time, and was apparently peppered with a lot of Urdu poems. The bilateral ran on for over an hour, according to the PM himself. "Afterwards we called the foreign secretaries. I asked the Pakistan Prime Minister to sum up what we had agreed. I added a little bit. Then we instructed the two foreign secretaries to come up with an agreed draft."

After that the two foreign secretaries and their delegations retired to hammer out a statement. The crux of the agreement was the "delinking" of action on terrorism with the composite dialogue. But India also decided that the "farce" of holding Pakistan to its pledge of January 6, 2004 should be done away with, because Pakistan had regularly flouted this pledge.

It's very clear that the two "new" elements were introduced by the PM. The first was the delinking, and the second, Balochistan.

The PM quite candidly explained why he included Balochistan in the statement. "The Prime Minister of Pakistan did bring up this thing when I said about terrorist acts aided, abetted and inspired from Pakistan's side. He said that in his country people say India is active in Balochistan. I said our conduct is an open book. We are willing to discuss all issues because we are doing nothing. And I said to him that I have been told several times that Indian consulates in Afghanistan are engaged in undesirable activities and I said these consulates have existed not today, they were set up way back in the 1950s. But if you have any evidence, we are willing to look at it because we are an open book; we are doing nothing. Therefore, we are not afraid of discussing these issues."

Extraordinarily, the almost conciliatory tone of the statement was at odds with the PM's own remarks barely an hour later. In fact, it was clear the PM was trying to interpret the statement in a particular way, because by then the Pakistanis had already interpreted the statement to mean that they were off the hook -- the umbilical cord between terror and dialogue was cut.

Shiv Shankar Menon, a seasoned negotiator, has defended the statement saying the "intention was clear". "You can call it good drafting or bad drafting, but the meaning is clear," he had told a group of questioning MPs earlier this week.

With an adaab, PM capitulates by Swapan Dasgupta

A photograph, it is said, is more telling than a thousand words of succinct prose. Last Friday morning, the readers of many newspapers may have observed a very revealing photograph from the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh where Indian and Pakistani delegations, led by their respective Prime Ministers, met on the sidelines of the redundant Non-Aligned Movement Summit. The photograph showed Manmohan Singh, flanked by Yousuf Raza Gilani, greeting a woman member of the Pakistani delegation with what, presumably, is either an adaab or a feeble imitation of the signature Pervez Musharraf salute.

How the Prime Minister of India chooses to greet a foreigner is an individual decision. He may offer a limp handshake or even a firm one; he may copy Fidel Castro’s bear hug; he may, though this is extremely unlikely, greet the visitor with a peck on both cheeks; he may favour a deep Japanese-style bow; and alternatively he may offer the traditional Namaste. It is entirely a personal decision and one that need not be bound in protocol, as long as it is laced with courtesy.

Not even his worst enemies will accuse Manmohan of either rudeness or discourtesy. He would not have invited charges of either cultural insensitivity or inappropriate conduct had he chosen to greet the Pakistani lady with folded hands. Most foreigners, in fact, expect to be greeted with a Namaste by an Indian, especially when it is a formal occasion.

That Manmohan chose to greet the Pakistani officials with an adaab is revealing. It suggested a mindset centred on supplication which translated politically means a desperate desire to accommodate and please. Pursuing the line of least resistance has been the signature tune of the PM in his relationship with the owners of the Congress, his coalition partners and in his conduct of foreign policy. Some may see in this Manmohan’s grand vision of reconciliation: Breakfasting in Delhi and lunching in Lahore. But attributing profundity to inanity is a well-known Indian trait, except these days it passes off as media management.

The outrageous joint statement issued from Sharm el-Sheikh has been analysed threadbare by a country which wants to know whether the ‘tough on terrorism’ stand adopted by India after the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai was meant for electoral consumption alone. Read with the apology the PM issued to President Asif Ali Zardari for miscuing his rehearsed lines at Yekaterinburg in Russia last month, the joint statement’s clear willingness to not let the trivial issue of terrorism mar the composite dialogue reveals the spinal condition of Indian diplomacy under Manmohan.

Manmohan’s inclination to appease the rogue state in Pakistan was first in evidence at the Havana summit of NAM two years ago when it was proclaimed that India and Pakistan were co-victims of terror. The groundwork for this shameful retreat from the Islamabad declaration of January 2004 had, in fact, been done at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Delhi immediately after the UPA Government assumed power in the summer of 2004 when it was stated that terrorism would not be allowed to derail the peace process.

However, what is intriguing about the latest reiteration of a decision to delink dialogue from acts of aggression is that it even caught the decision-making apparatus of the Government unawares. The overall consensus in the Ministry of External Affairs and the intelligence agencies was that it would be imprudent to resume formal dialogue with a duplicitous neighbour unless there was clear evidence that it was taking firm and effective steps to defang the terrorists operating from within its territory. It was felt that any engagement with Pakistan could well be conducted within the framework of discreet back channel diplomacy.

This was the gist of the briefing by the Foreign Secretary to the Indian media accompanying the Prime Minister to Egypt. At best, Manmohan was expected to show some recognition of the civilian Government’s difficulties in confronting a monster that had been nurtured by the Pakistan military establishment and the ISI. After all, Zardari had owned up to Pakistan’s role in sustaining fanatical jihadis. Not even the most clued-in expected Manmohan to walk the entire mile to placate Pakistan, going to the ridiculous extent of even tacitly conceding an Indian role in the disturbances in Baluchistan.

Conspiracy theories tend normally to be a little fanciful but there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that Manmohan’s actions may be guided by a nudge and a wink from the US. That Washington no longer has the stomach to continue the fight in Afghanistan is hardly the world’s best kept secret. But no disentanglement from Afghanistan is possible for the US unless it has some assurance that Pakistan is not going to fill the vacuum with a barbaric Taliban regime intent on wreaking havoc in the heartlands of Western ‘decadence’. Was India chipping in to raise Pakistan’s comfort level? Has India become a collaborator in the US’s AfPak policy?

At this juncture only questions can be raised. But there is merit in scrutinising a number of other steps taken by Manmohan to placate the US. First, there was the change of the Commerce Minister followed by clear indications that the ‘intransigence’ of Kamal Nath would be reviewed in future WTO negotiations. Second, in signing the G-8 declaration, Manmohan indicated a retreat from India’s existing policy on Climate Change. Finally, by adding his signature to the G-8 proclamation on non-proliferation, Manmohan may have taken the first covert step in accommodating the Obama Administration’s determination to rollback India’s gains from the agreements with the IAEA and NSG.

These are early days yet but Manmohan’s adaab suggests that accommodation of others rather than enlightened self-interest may become the new principle of Indian foreign policy. Maybe the time is fast approaching when India should prepare to do its Namaste to him, before he travels down the IK Gujral route.

The silence of Mr Singh by Ashok Malik

For PM, Indian blood is cheap by Kanchan Gupta

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is a decent and honest man. His admirers would say he is an economist too. His detractors (a plague on their houses!) don’t quite see it that way and his critics (may they never escape the damnation of hell!) think he is a feckless man given to spinning webs of deceit to cover up his sins of omission and commission. So, there is no reason to doubt that when he met Pakistan’s Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (yes, it still exists) Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh last Thursday, Mr Singh did the tough-guys-don’t-cry act with him.

Sharm surrender not surprising by Balbir K Punj

It takes a whole new level of talent ...

A Sharm-less surrender by G Parthasarathy

Assertions by Mr Singh that India and Pakistan are both equally “victims” of terrorism, that they share a “common destiny”, or that a rising India cannot assert its rightful place in the comity of nations without good relations with Pakistan, are factually incorrect and undermine Indian diplomacy. A democratic, secular India cannot share a “common destiny” with a theocratic, feudal and military-dominated Pakistan, which is being challenged by terrorists the ISI backed to ‘bleed’ India and seek ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. India, on the other hand has been a victim of the terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. Equating the two countries, as we have done in Sharm el-Sheikh, is ill-advised. India’s economic growth has accelerated and its international profile has flourished by its partnership with the international community in forums like the G-8 and G-20, despite Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and diplomatic hostility. We can ‘rise’ in the world with or without Pakistan’s cooperation. The more we suggest that we need Pakistan’s meherbani to accelerate economic growth, or rise in world affairs, the more those who cannot countenance India’s rise in the world within Pakistan’s establishment will continue to ‘bleed’ us.

There are serious differences between Mr Zardari, who has genuinely sought accommodation and cooperation with India, and Mr Gilani, who rose in politics with the support of Gen Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s. Mr Gilani echoes the hardline approach of Pakistan’s military establishment. How then are India’s national interests served by embarrassing Mr Zardari in Yekaterinburg and appeasing Mr Gilani in Sharm el-Sheikh?

Even fundamentalist Muslim Rightist MJ Akbar is pissed (Manmohan endorses a statement out of joint) about this blunder by Overrated World Renowned Mythical Economist and Dhimmi Regent Sellout PM Mr. Manmohan Singh. May be now the latter would try and reverse the damage in order to at least appease his Muslim Ummah.

Diplomatic Surrender by Manmohan Singh

Here is a very good writeup by Mr. Lal Krishna Advani on the disastrous & shameful diplomatic surrender of Bharat (misnomer: India) to Pakistan by Antonia Maino-Manmohan Singh's Muslim Rightist Congress government.

Diplomatic Surrender by Manmohan Singh

It distresses me to note that national consensus to fight terrorism has been undermined by the UPA government itself, which, as recent developments have shown, has even disregarded the national mood in this matter. As I speak here today, there is intense disquiet and concern among all thinking Indians, including a section of the Congress party itself, over the latest India-Pakistan Joint Statement issued on 16 July 2009 following talks between Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, who met in Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt on the sidelines of the NAM summit. It marks a major diplomatic surrender on India’s part.

History tells us how, in the Indo-Pak wars in 1965 and 1971, the then Congress governments gave away on the diplomatic front the gains India had made on the battlefront. Both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi at least had India’s proud military victories to their credit. In contrast, Dr. Manmohan Singh is the first Indian Prime Minister who has squandered India’s diplomatic advantage over Pakistan even before the battle against Pak-sponsored terrorism is far from over.

I find the latest India-Pakistan Joint Statement to be totally unacceptable for three reasons.

1. Firstly, it marks a big retreat by the Indian government from its own oft-stated position on talks with Pakistan when it states in the Joint Statement: “ Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed”.
   
   Prime Minister Singh said that India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including “all outstanding issues.” Whatever Dr. Singh may have said subsequently by way of clarification, he has agreed, in black and white, that “India was ready to discuss all issues with Pakistan, including all outstanding issues” such as Kashmir ― indeed, this is what constitutes the so-called Composite Dialogue ― and that that such dialogue will not be linked to “action on terrorism”.
   
   
2. India’s insistence thus far has been that Pakistan must bring the Pak-based masterminds of the 26/11 terror attack on Mumbai to book before any meaningful talks with Islamabad can begin. How does government reconcile this affirmation with the latest statement?
   
   
3. The Sharm-el-Sheikh statement only says “Action on terrorism” and does not explicitly state “Pakistan’s action on terrorism”. This is ominous because, in the very preceding sentence, it states: “Prime Minister Gilani mentioned that Pakistan has some information on threats in Baluchistan and other areas.”

For the first time in the history of India’s diplomatic engagement with Pakistan, the Indian side has allowed Pakistan to mention Baluchistan, in a formal India-Pakistan statement, and that too in such a way that India is made to look like the sponsor of terrorism in “Baluchistan” and also “in other areas” !

In other words, the perpetrator of terrorism, which is what Pakistan really is, has succeeded, with the Indian government’s help, to project itself as a victim of India-sponsored terrorism.

In view of the Prime Minister’s diplomatic capitulation before Pakistan, I am constrained to make the following three demands:

• India must suspend all official talks with Islamabad, including secretary-level talks, until we get credible proof that the government of Pakistan has taken necessary action against the masterminds of the terror attack on Mumbai. Recent reports that the chief of Lashkar-e-Toiba was released by the high court due to poor handling of the case by the prosecution, and no appeal has been filed in the Supreme Court until now, are indeed ominous.

• India must seek the extradition of all those involved in all the cross-border terrorist activities in India, such as Dawood Ibrahim, who have been given shelter in Pakistan.

• India must insist on timebound dismantling of the entire anti-India terrorist infrastructure based on Pakistani soil. In this, we have admission from no less a person than Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari, who stated two weeks ago that terrorists were “created and nurtured” in his country in order to achieve “some short-term tactical objectives”. He also said that “terrorists of today were the heroes of past until Mumbai terror attacks in India on 26 November 2008.”

Shame on you Manmohan Singh, Shame on you!

"Mr Singh has proved a hopeless decision maker as Prime Minister."
- Financial Times, London, April 15 2009

"The Government has assaulted and weakened every constitutional office: the Election Commission, Governors and Parliament."
- Outlook, March 2 2009

Please also read, "Manmohan Singh agrees with Indian Mujahideen terrorists?".
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Shame on you Mr. Manmohan Singh, so carelessly and shamelessly bending over backwards to mooch from the Pakistanis instead of showing them their deserving place down the gallows for practically waging fifth war on Bharat (misnomer: India) on 11/26/2008. Third being the proxy war through terrorism to mass murder innocent Bharatvaasi (misnomer: Indians) particularly Hindus and fourth being the Kargil war. Through the display of such pathetic misadventures, it seems that you may have no remorse for the deaths of thousands under your previous government when Bharat had to face 47 major terrorist attacks in 68 cities including the unprecedented Islamic terrorist attack in Mumbai and countless terrorist attacks in Gauhati (misnomer: Guwahati), a city from where you have been conveniently making a back door Rajya Sabha entry for past 12 years.

I couldn't believe my eyes when I saw a so-called head of state, no less than a regent in this case, jumping head over heals to shake hands with the head of a terrorist state without a shred of restraint. A terrorist state, which has an official state policy to destroy Bharat ever since it was mistakenly born due to gross miscalculations of Congress founders. The same head of state whose citizens carried out mass murder of Bharatiya (misnomer: Indian) citizens particularly Hindus while your Muslim Rightist nonsecular Congress's heir Raul Vinci aka Rahul Gandhi was out partying till 5 AM in the morning and the whole Nehru-Gandhi-Maino family was seen celebrating at friend's wedding in the next few days, again without any visible restraint.

As they say history repeats itself. Indira Nehru Feroz Gandhi committed a blunder by releasing Pakistani POWs and returned Pakistani territory after war without any negotiations or heck arm twisting on Kashmir. All she got in return was ridiculous Shimla Agreement and Pakistani's went back home laughing with all the water of Bharat's rivers. 20 years later Overrated World Renowned Mythical Economist and Dhimmi Regent PM Mr. Manmohan Singh committed the same mistake. This monstrosity of a blunder that you call this latest Bharat-Pakistan joint statement is such a shameful surrender.

As a report in Times of India reported, "There is not a single reference to LeT or a single reference to its continuing terrorist infrastructure. But India has provided dignity to Pakistan’s baseless allegations against Baloch freedom-fighters by agreeing to make a reference to Balochistan in the joint statement in the context of terrorism by indirectly bringing on record in an official statement Pakistan’s projection of the late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti and other Baloch leaders as terrorists."

You didn't even bring up the recent horrifying news that there is a severe terrorist threat to Shri Somnath Mandir in Gujarat and other important Hindu Temples and that Pakistan is making fortified bunkers in Jammu and Kashmir. As per a ANI/Reuters report "India's paramilitary Border Security Force on Tuesday said Pakistan was constructing fortified bunkers and observation posts along the India-Pakistan border in Jammu and Kashmir. UK Bansal, BSF's special director general, said this after attending a passing out parade at Subsidiary Training Centre." On one hand BSF is raising futile "strong objections" with Pakistani Rangers but Manmohan Singh is too busy shaking hands with the enemy.

What's with all the hypocrisy and confusion? Are you talking with Pakistan or not? In the first of the following videos you say you want to talk to Pakistan and in the very next one you say that you don't want to talk to Pakistan. What an amazing foreign policy management skill! Playing to the audience...eh?

From your nonsecular divisive statements like Muslims have first right on India to leaderless governance in the times of crisis to allegedly Rigging of the 2009 election, your blunder list just keeps on growing. Unfortunately, as a consequence of your pusillanimous attitude, Bharat continues to keep on bleeding with thousand cuts.

Lal Krishna Advani accuses Manmohan Singh of 'squandering' diplomatic advantage

As I speak here today, there is intense disquiet and concern among all thinking Indians, including a section of the Congress party itself, over the latest India-Pakistan Joint Statement issued on 16 July 2009 following talks between Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart, Mr. Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, who met in Sharm-el-Sheikh in Egypt on the sidelines of the NAM summit. It marks a major diplomatic surrender on India’s part.

History tells us how, in the Indo-Pak wars in 1965 and 1971, the then Congress governments gave away on the diplomatic front the gains India had made on the battlefront. Both Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi at least had India’s proud military victories to their credit. In contrast, Dr. Manmohan Singh is the first Indian Prime Minister who has squandered India’s diplomatic advantage over Pakistan even before the battle against Pak-sponsored terrorism is far from over.

For the first time in the history of India’s diplomatic engagement with Pakistan, the Indian side has allowed Pakistan to mention Baluchistan, in a formal India-Pakistan statement, and that too in such a way that India is made to look like the sponsor of terrorism in “Baluchistan” and also “in other areas” !

In other words, the perpetrator of terrorism, which is what Pakistan really is, has succeeded, with the Indian government’s help, to project itself as a victim of India-sponsored terrorism.

On a lighter note. We don't know what was the fuss about Obama or Sarkozy checking out Mayara Tavares's ass, what we wonder is where was Manmohan Singh looking at? Certainly not towards the sky.




References:

1. Documentary on 26/11 Islamic Terror attack in Mumbai


2. For Manmohan, Indian blood is cheap


3. "piss process": 11/26 invasion by pak terrorists forgiven by manmohan singh


4. Sweet surrender


5. Text of India-Pakistan joint statement in Sharm-el-Sheikh between Manmohan Singh and Pakistan PM Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani on July 16, 2009


6. Shame uproar greets Singh


7. Lal Krishna Advani accuses Manmohan Singh of 'squandering' diplomatic advantage


8. Gilani claims victory as PM delinks terror from talks

   Even as India denied having made concessions or shifting of goalposts to Pakistan's benefit, the latter was gloating over the outcome.
   
   There are three aspects of the joint statement where India has given ground to Pakistan. First, the formulation "action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed" suggests a climbdown by India which had consistently maintained that the talks could not take place till the 26/11 perpetrators were punished. Pakistan, which pressed for resumption of talks, has merely promised to do "everything in its power in this regard", seen as too general a commitment.
   
   The PM was at pains to control the damage. He told journalists, "The composite dialogue process cannot resume unless and until terrorist acts, like the one which shook Mumbai, are properly accounted for and perpetrators of these heinous crimes are brought to book." Indian officials said the statement means Pakistan cannot ask for a resumption of composite dialogue by showing "action" against terrorism.
   
   But that's not how the statement is being read. Pakistan for instance read it very differently. Gilani said, "All core issues that were pending under composite dialogue should be discussed... That should not be bracketed with this Mumbai incident."
   
   The joint statement is silent on Pakistan's commitment of January 6, 2004 that that it will not allow its territory to be used for terrorism against India. In a sense Pakistan can feel freed from that promise. India's concession on this front comes even as intelligence and information mount of more and deadly terror attacks being planned against India from Pakistan-based and supported terror groups.
   
   Singh later took a completely different line to cover up. He said, "Dialogue process cannot move forward even if it resumes so long as Pakistan's territory is used for terrorism directed against India."
   
   But the area where India appears to have capitulated most is by agreeing to take Pakistan's Balochistan problem from being an internal affair of Pakistan to a bilateral issue, by allowing it to be placed in the joint statement. It's a big gain for Pakistan, because it legitimises Islamabad's contention that the Balochistan unrest was being fomented by India. When asked about this, the PM answered defensively, "India has nothing to be afraid about events in Balochistan. Our policies are an open book there. We are willing to discuss anything." But everybody is aware that India showed a chink that Pakistan will be quick to exploit.



9. US pressure behind soft line with Pakistan


10. Experts seethe over Balochi blunder


11. Clearly, India has succumbed


12. Balochistan bungle may prove costly


13. Opposition slams PM over 'sellout' to Pakistan


14. The U-turn on Pakistan


15. BJP says it’s ‘capitulation’ as PM claims no change


16. Rigging of the 2009 election in India


17. आतंकवाद से नहीं रुकेगी भारत-पाक वार्ता


18. पाक ने सौंपे मुंबई हमलों के दस्तावेज


19. Hoping for mile from Pak, India gives more than an inch


20. आतंकवाद के ख़िलाफ़ साझा कार्रवाई पर सहमति

Documentary on 26/11 Islamic Terror attack in Mumbai

This is one of the best documentary that I have found on Islamic Jihadi Terrorist attack by radical Pakistani Muslims in Mumbai, Bharat (misnomer: India) on 11/26/2008 which left over 200 innocent people dead, most of them Hindus. Its called "Dispatches: Terror in Mumbai" and is made by filmmaker Dan Reed for UK based Channel 4. It shows intimate and privy details about the attack that took place including phone calls by the terrorists to their masters in Pakistan, lone captured Pakistani Muslim Terrorist Mohamed Ajmal Amir Kasab's confession video, Indian media's unprofessional coverage, Muslim Rightist Congress led Government's leaderless mismanagement of crisis, inapt security response, CCTV videos, interviews of hostages, victims & policemen, etc.

One of the victim revealed that these Islamic Terrorists selectively chose NOT to kill Muslims and selectively mass murdered the Non-Muslims especially Hindus. This was also validated by other victims testimony and Mohamed Kasab's confession. Terrorists called their Muslim hostages as "brothers" and let them go unharmed.

So what exactly was Congress led UPA's Indian Government doing at the time?

Well, during that time, Muslim Rightist nonsecular Congress's heir Raul Vinci aka Rahul Gandhi was out partying till 5 AM in the morning and the whole Nehru-Gandhi-Maino family was seen celebrating at friend's wedding in the next few days. This is the same Islamic Terrorist attack about which Muslim Rightist Congress led Maharashtra Government's then Home Minister & Deputy Chief Minister Raosaheb Ramchandra (R.R.) Patil said "ऐसा नहीं है। इतने बड़े शहर में छोटा हादसा हो जाता है। तो total failure नहीं है।/Aisa nahi hai। Itne bade shahar mein chhota hadsa ho jata hai। To total failure nahi hai। (It is not like that. In big cities like this, small incidents do happen. It's is not a total failure.)". Hence, implying it was no big deal.

Richard Nixon & Henry Kissinger's Taped conversation: Indira Gandhi is a Bitch & an Old Witch

Below are the infamous declassified documents containing the transcript of conversation between US President (January 20, 1969 – August 9, 1974) Mr. Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Mr. Henry Kissinger in which they abused Bharatvaasi (misnomer: Indians) and called the then Bharatiya (misnomer: Indian) Prime Minister Dictator Indira Nehru Feroz Gandhi as "a bitch" and "the old witch". She is the same Prime Minister who gave us THE darkest days in Bharatiya Democracy by unethically and unjustifiably declaring Emergency on June 25, 1975 till March 21, 1977. During this dark period of Emergency, despotic Indira made many immoral changes to the constitution including to the Preamble of the Bharatiya Constitution. Here are some famous pictures from the days of Emergency.

The famous cartoon by Abu Abraham showing the former President of India, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, signing the proclamation of Emergency from his bathtub.

Dictator Indira Gandhi's despotic regime found this cartoon by Abu Abraham in Indian Express not fit for publication as it was critical of her censorship. Cartoon was CENSORED. See the rejection stamp.

One MAN Government.

श्रमेव-जयते or Shram-eva-Jayate was another slogan then. Indira Gandhi's stooges colleagues labored hard.

One of the outputs generated from Dictator Indira Gandhi's propaganda machine: Price of Liberty Indian people had to pay.

Dictator Indira Gandhi had ministerial colleagues during dark days of Emergency who all resembled this.

Frontpage of Indian Herald Newspaper when Emergency (Darkest days of Indian Democracy) was enforced by Indira Gandhi & Indian National Congress and opposition including great stalwart Indian leaders like Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Mr. Lal Krishna Advani, et al, the then opposition, were thrown in jail.

Frontpage of The Hindu Newspaper when Emergency (Darkest days of Indian Democracy) was enforced by Indira Gandhi & Indian National Congress and press censorship was imposed.

Jayaprakash Narayan (JP) leading people to Parliament Street against Emergency.

All vacant sites of outdoor media and billboards had to display such dictatorial messages.

Few examples of her tyrannies which made complete mockery of the Bharatiya Constitution and civil liberties:
* Suspension of Fundamental Rights
* Article 14 – Right to Equality before Law
* Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty
* Article 22 – Protection against Arrest and Detention in certain cases
* Gain of extraordinary power
* 39 th Amendment – Made proclamation of Emergency non-justiciable
* 40 th Amendment – Courts prevented from hearing against President, PM, Speaker
* 41 st Amendment – Conferred immunity to PM against criminal proceedings in just about every conceivable case
* 42 nd Amendment – Authorised President to amend Constitution for 2 years
* Abolished the need for quorum in Parliament (2/3 could make laws for India!)

These documents "Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972" were released by Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State on June 28, 2005.

As per the Press Release,

For the period January 1969 to February 1971 and all of 1972, the e-volume released today provides full coverage of U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the newly created state of Bangladesh. The e-volume also contains documentation that supplements the print volume XI. These additional documents on India and Pakistan for the period March to December 1971 include intelligence assessments, key messages from the U.S. Embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi and the Consulate General in Dacca, responses to National Security Study Memoranda, and full transcripts of Presidential tape recordings that are summarized and excerpted in editorial notes in volume XI.

Even before the "tilt" toward Pakistan during the war, the Nixon administration concluded that peace and stability in South Asia could only be maintained by aiding Pakistan against a stronger India that was receiving military aid from the Soviet Union. In addition, Pakistan was serving as a secret conduit on behalf of Nixon and Kissinger in their attempts to open contacts with the People's Republic of China. A major theme of this e-volume is the Nixon administration's policy of so-called one-time only exceptions of arms sales to Pakistan, a policy that reversed the Johnson administration's moratorium on lethal military sales to both countries after the 1965 war. When, over the objections of Secretary of State William Rogers, Nixon released for sale to Pakistan 100 U.S. tanks (formerly the property of Turkish armed forces), U.S.-Indian relations, which had not been good, deteriorated even further. India responded by closing some United States Information Service (USIS) cultural centers.

After its supplemental coverage of the conclusion of the 1971 war, the major theme of the e-volume is the U.S. adjustment to a new balance of power in South Asia. The Nixon administration offered substantial economic aid and limited military aid to Pakistan under its new civilian president, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Pakistan did not consider the military aid sufficient, but relations between Pakistan and the United States were generally good. U.S. relations with India showed some improvement, as Washington responded cautiously to overtures from India for better bilateral relations. There was, however, the realization among the U.S. intelligence community and the Washington bureaucracy that India had a growing potential for producing nuclear weapons.

"Indira was a bitch to Nixon" by Chidanand Rajghatta on July 1, 2005

The United States may be cooing and billing over India now, but just 35 years ago, its President and National Security Advisor corrosively called then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a bitch and a witch, felt Indians were sanctimonious and hypocritical bastards, and wished India would be struck by a famine and lose badly in a war.

The dramatis personae in some of the most toxic exchanges are Richard Nixon, a coarse and foul-mouthed Republican president who was left office in disgrace after being impeached in the Watergate scandal, and his sidekick Henry Kissinger, a great votary of Indo-U.S ties today, who some regard as the greatest war criminal alive.

The scene is the winter of 1971 when a military dictatorship in Pakistan has unleashed a brutal genocide in the eastern wing of the country, raping, looting and killing its Hindu minorities and intellectuals on a scale that makes today's excesses in the region look like a picnic. Although U.S diplomats in Dhaka sent frantic cables chronicling the brutalities, Nixon's only concern is how to protect Pakistan and its dictator Yahya Khan against a country which he feels is too close to the Soviet Union and has been ungrateful to the United States.

They also discuss manipulating public opinion and trash American diplomats who they see as sympathetic to the Indian plight of handling millions of refugees streaming into West Bengal from then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

In later conversations, Nixon and Kissinger call Keating a bastard, a traitor, and a weak son of a bitch. Pakistan's military dictator Yahya Khan, who was responsible for the slaughter of more than a million Bangladeshis is, in Nixon's words ''a decent, honorable man.''

Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Document 150

150. Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Chief of Staff (Haldeman), Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:15-9:00 a.m.

Nixon: This is just the point when she is a bitch.

Kissinger: Well, the Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there. It's—to them East Pakistan is no longer the issue. Now, I found it very interesting how she carried on to you yesterday about West Pakistan.

Nixon: I think I'll make the meeting today a rather brief—cool. [unclear] I don't mean by that cool in terms of not trying to bring up [unclear] I'll talk to her a little about Vietnam, and-

Kissinger: I'd let her talk a little more, maybe today—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —to be a little less forthcoming. But basically, Mr. President—

Nixon: So I was trying to give her no excuses. Now I've talked to her, told her everything we're going to do. Now it's up to her.

Kissinger: While she was a bitch, we got what we wanted too. You very subtly—I mean, she will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn't give her a warm reception and therefore, in despair, she's got to go to war.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: So her objective—she has a right to be a little sore because you thwarted her objective. She would rather have had you give her a cool reception—

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: —so that she could say that she was really put upon.

Nixon: Oh, we really—

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: We really slobbered over the old witch.

Kissinger: How you slobbered over her in things that did not matter, but in the things that did matter—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —you didn't give her an inch. So that she's—

Nixon: She knows.

Kissinger: She knows she isn't coming out of here with any—she can't go home and say, "The president promised to do the following for me," and then when you don't do it—

Nixon: Did you get across with that clown yesterday afternoon at 5:00? You went on the, that as far as the, as she was concerned that she would consider letting him—

Kissinger: Yep.

Nixon: —consult with regard to the designation. We want to be sure he understood that was the situation.

Kissinger: Right, and I fixed it in the memorandum of conversation which I'm giving him in such a way that it—just a little. I've made it a little more explicit.

Nixon: Now you've covered Rogers for long enough—

Kissinger: Oh yeah, Rogers is in good shape.

Nixon: He's prepared to be told this?

Kissinger: Oh yes. They've apparently treated him personally in a way that he doesn't like, so he's very—

Nixon: Ha!

Kissinger: No, no. He'll be very tough with them.

Nixon: Yeah, he's likely to be sharper with them than I was, you know. He can do that [unclear].

Kissinger: Well, he will be personally sharper but he doesn't like her. In substance he won't be as tough as you—

Nixon: He's likely [unclear].

Kissinger: —because he doesn't know the subject so well. I mean the skill—

Nixon: You should have heard, Bob, the way we worked her around. I dropped stilettos all over her. It's like, you know—

Kissinger: She didn't know [unclear exchange] about the guerrillas in East Pakistan. [unclear]. One thing that really struck me, the blown up [unclear] and that takes a lot of technical training. I wonder where they got that.

Nixon: She [unclear] so fast.

Kissinger: She said the East Bengal rifles [unclear-used to?]. That's where it came from.

Nixon: That's right. We also stuck it to her on that book—Henry's book about India-Pakistan.

Kissinger: She said she studied a lot about the problems—how these conflicts started. Read a book by Maxwell, called India-China War, which is a book that in effect proves that India started the '62 War. It was done with an enormous politeness and courtesy and warmth.

Nixon: Well I acted as if I didn't know what the hell had happened—

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: —so she couldn't say anything. But she knew goddamn well that I knew what happened, don't you think?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. You stuck it to her about the press.

Nixon: On that I hit it hard.

Kissinger: And I told—

Nixon: I raised my voice a little.

Kissinger: And I told her assistant—I told my opposite number that the thing that is really striking to us is that last year Mrs. Gandhi, during her election campaign, made official protests that we were intervening when we weren't. And she never produced any proof. And yet every opposition candidate gets a royal reception, tremendous publicity, personal meetings. And then after you do all of this you come over here and ask us to solve all your problems.

Nixon: You told him that?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: Good for you.

Kissinger: I said look at the record the last 3 months. You've had a press campaign against us. You put out the word that our relations are the worst ever. You get Kennedy over. You get that Congressman Gallagher over. You make a treaty with the Russians. And then you come here and say we have to solve your problems for you.

Nixon: Well if it was any—

Kissinger: But, Mr. President, even though she was a bitch, we shouldn't overlook the fact that we got what we wanted, which was we kept her from going out of here saying that the United States kicked her in the teeth. We've got the film clip of this; you've got the toast. You've got the general warmth that you generated in the personal meeting.

Nixon: I do think at dinner tonight [unclear].

Kissinger: You didn't give her a goddamn thing.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: If you would have put on a Johnson performance, it would have been emotionally more satisfying but it would have hurt us. Because—I mean if you had been rough with her—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —then she'd be crying, going back crying to India. So I think even though she is a bitch, I'd be a shade cooler today, but—

Nixon: No, no. I mean, "cool" in terms of, like yesterday, as you noted, I tried to carry the conversation.

Kissinger: No, I'd let her carry it.

Nixon: And was sort of saying, "look, we're being as good as we can in dealing with Pakistan. What else can we do?" Today, I'm just going to say [unclear].

Kissinger: That's what I would do. Except for Vietnam, I'd give her 5 minutes of the Tito talk because it will go right back to the Russians as well as to the Vietnamese.

Nixon: Will it?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. They have the closest diplomatic ties now with Russia. They leak everything right back to them.

Nixon-Kissinger's views about the then US Ambassador to Bharat (misnomer: India) Mr. Kenneth Barnard Keating were not that respectful either and they also ridiculed Bharat's security concerns which were being echoed by Mr. Keating in those times.

Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Document 136

136. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42-9:51 a.m.

Nixon: I told Keating that I would see him—he was there last night at this little party we had—and I told him I would see him when he came back, late and in the middle of June, just before the Foreign Minister came. And I think we'll just have him for a half hour and then have him—

Kissinger: I saw him leaving.

Nixon: I also told him that, I said the problem here is that we just got to be sure we don't get involved in an internal conflict, be pulled one way or another, so forth and so on.

Kissinger: He's almost fanatical on this issue.

Nixon: Well what the hell does he think we should do about it?

Kissinger: Oh he thinks—I tell you, he thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out of—

Nixon: Push—I don't want him to come in with that kind of jackass thing with me.

Kissinger: Mr. President, actually we've got to keep Yahya, we have to keep Yahya [unclear] public executions for the next month.

Nixon: Look, even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn't do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good. Now Keating, like every Ambassador who goes over there, goes over there and gets sucked in. He now thinks the—

Kissinger: Those sons-of-bitches, who never have lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It's going be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: No resources. They're going to become a ripe field for Communist infiltration. And then they're going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta. That they may have in the back of their mind.

Nixon: Oh, what they had in the back of their mind was to destroy Pakistan.

Following is an excerpt from the telegram to various American Embassies. It informs of US's stand vis-a-vis Bharat and Pakistan conflict during that time. It also makes clear as to what does the then Nixon administration thought of Bharatvaasi. As per the telegram, Bhutto actually wanted reconciliation with Bharat but had some constraints for which he wanted US to put pressure on Bharat.

Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Document 193

TELEGRAM
ACTION Amembassy ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy NEW DELHI
USUN NEW YORK Amembassy LONDON Amembassy MOSCOW Amembassy TEHRAN Amembassy PARIS
Amconsul DACCA
Amconsul CALCUTTA

STATE
Deliver opening of Business Dec. 19.
SUBJECT: Secretary's Conversation with Bhutto
1. Following is uncleared Memcon, FYI, and subject to revision upon review.

2. Pak Deputy PM-designate, Z. A. Bhutto, called on Secretary December 18 prior to call on President. Bhutto accompanied by Ambassador Raza. Sisco and Laingen sat in. Bhutto expressed deep appreciation that US had stood by Pakistan in defense QUOTE basic principles international law and civilized society UNQUOTE, indicated strong concern over Soviet policies in achieving QUOTE reversal of Cubas at Pakistan's cost UNQUOTE, and pledged determination seek reconciliation with India. Essential, however, that Indian forces leave East Pakistan promptly; said he thought it still possible preserve Pak unity on basis very loose confederation. In any event effort must be made and he was returning to Pakistan forthwith not to rock boat but to do what he could in context transfer of political power which now vital and urgent. Secretary stressed strong USG support for Pakistan, understanding for severe problems ahead, and intention continue be as helpful as possible. Assured Bhutto we would consult closely before any action re Bangla Desh but noted likelihood we would need and wish to support international humanitarian relief that area.
(Continued next page)

3. Secretary gave Bhutto warm welcome, emphasizing our understanding that this was sad time in history Pakistan and that we very pleased to get Bhutto's views directly regarding future and what we can do together to be helpful. Noted we have tried to do what we could to help in current crisis and that president particularly was understanding and sympathetic on basis certain basic principles and was looking forward to meeting Bhutto later in day.

----------------Deleted, please go to original source----------------

6. Second fundamental point was that he and Pakistani people were. prepared for reconciliation with India. India now has glorious opportunity either to seek reconciliation with Pakistan or become enemy of Pakistan, for all time on scale like Carthage and Rome. If India
missed present opportunity, there would be hatred for all time, utter chaos and terrible massacre. He shuddered to think what this could mean for Muslims in Bengal. Moreover, this hatred would spread to whole subcontinent: India must act with magnanimity. Honorable adjustments between two countries could be made but these could not be made in vacuum and would require time.

----------------Deleted, please go to original source----------------

11. Secretary took note of Bhutto's hope India would act with magnanimity but noted that despite capacity of Indians often to appear magnanimous publicly and on the record, they could be very sanctimonious and self-righteous and act quite differently privately. Bhutto concurred and said it most Important for this reason that USG not lose current political initiative. US should make clear to India that it had treaty relationship with Pakistan and that it was not going to fold up its carpets and leave." India should also be made to understand from US that latter giving serious consideration to massive economic assistance and considering military assistance in order to restore strategic balance in South Asia. Indians must understand from US that it has major global interests that have been adversely affected by recent Soviet action South Asia and that it would take these into account in seeking long-term permanent settlement. Indians should also hear from US that they could not do one thing in East Pakistan and something else in Kashmir. Indians had used force in East Pakistan but what of Kashmir?

12. These were things that USG should now be telling. India. Whether USG could in fact provide military and economic aid now was not so important. (He aware of public opinion trends in US.) USG and GOP could talk about such things later; important thing was that India should have clear understanding that we considering such action. Secretary commented that India should also understand that accom plishing secession of a neighboring state by force was dangerous principle with widespread consequences. Bhutto agreed,saying this was dangerous Pandora's box.
13. Secretary observed that he hoped that Bhutto understood that USG would be under strong pressure public opinion to continue involve itself
actively in humanitarian relief actions in Bangla Desh. Bhutto said he understood this but hoped it would be done in way that would not imply recognition and would not complicate GOP's negotiating stance on future of East Pakistan.

14. In response questions by Secretary and Sisco re future evolution East-West Pakistan relations, Bhutto said Pakistan ready and willing negotiate new arrangement, It was important, however, that this be done by people of Pakistan and that there must be withdrawal Indian forces.

----------------Deleted, please go to original source----------------

15. Secretary asked what basic stance Bhutto thought USG should take toward East Pakistan. Bhutto's response was that US could not be unfriendly to 70 million people These people would be heavily dependent on USG since India could obviously do little to help them and only US could Promise "hope." In response specific query from Secretary, Bhutto said hem. convinced that confederation on "very loose
basis" would have been possible in past between East and West Pakistan; he could not say with certainty whether this now possible but it was important that people of Pakistan be allowed to make an effort to accomplish, this. Tragically, what had now happened had set back development in East Pakistan by fifty years. India could do nothing to help in this respect.

16. Bhutto said Mrs. Gandhi now faced dangerous situation. She had laid basis for "Bangla Deshes allover Subcontinent." (At separate point, referred to "bug of secession" that could spread very fast in-West Pakistan if previous balance -between East and West not present.) Said Mrs. Gandhi would rue the day she had "gone to bed with Soviet bear."[Emphasis added] Soviets had no humanitarian instincts at all.

----------------Deleted, please go to original source----------------

In this conversation Nixon calls Bharatvaasi hypocrites and sanctimonious.

Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972
Document 146

Nixon: The Indians did insist there's this, and, you know, they're hypocrites and sanctimonious about this. Now there's no question that Yahya has handled it really in a stupid way. I mean, and the only way you would expect in [with?] all the military backing. He's a very decent man, but it's just been handled badly. And in any case that the country is inevitable, as it's inevitable this country will tear part, come apart. But the Indians, the Indians are playing—I'm afraid from all reports, they're playing a game here that I think is wrong. I think they're deliberately trying to make it insoluble. And if it becomes insoluble what happens? Well, what happens is you have India, which can't even digest what they already have, probably—how the hell are they going to run that place? The other thing is that there is the danger, and there is the danger that a West Pakistani with a suicidal attitude will decide to have a fight.

Douglas-Home: Through Kashmir?

Nixon: Certainly.

Kissinger: We've had an intelligence report today—I don't know that [unclear]—Well, that they're thinking of going into Kashmir because this situation, as the Foreign Secretary is pointing out, is getting unmanageable.

Nixon: What can we do? What can be done?

This is a talk between the then US Secretary and the then Pakistani Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed in which US Secretary wishes that Bharat looses the war and that too badly. This conversation is just amazing. It shows how far apart Bharat and US stood under Dictator Indira Nehru Gandhi and compare it to how close they are today because of relentless efforts of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's BJP led NDA Government (1998-2004).

Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976
Document 176

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: September 30, 1974
TIME: 4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: The Call of the Pakistani Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs, Aziz Ahmed on the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS:

Pakistan:
Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed
Ambassador Sahabzada Yaqub Khan
Minister-Counselor Iqbal Riza

U.S.:
The Secretary
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
Robert Oakley, NSC
Peter D. Constable, NEA/PAB (Notetaker)

DISTRIBUTION: S; S/S; WH (General Scowcroft)

THE SECRETARY: I am pleased to see you. I look forward to my visit to Pakistan at the end of the month.

AZIZ AHMED: We are looking forward to your visit too. It will be a very short visit, but I don't blame you. I know you are very hard-pressed. It is remarkable how much you can do.

THE SECRETARY: I am very pressed for time. My program is the same in each country except for an extra day in India. I have never been there before as Secretary of State. I have had a telegram from Ambassador Byroade conveying some concerns about my visit to India. We would like to move the Indians away from the Soviets. But we are not engaging in a reorientation of our foreign policy. You must not be rattled by our moves with India.

AZIZ AHMED: I had a call from Prime Minister Bhutto yesterday and he asked me to convey some thoughts to you. He was concerned by reports that you had said there was a dramatic improvement in relations between the U.S. and India, and that all differences had been resolved.

THE SECRETARY: I said there had been an improvement in relations and that is substantially true, although it is not so much from what we are doing. We want to move them away from the Soviets. But we would never tolerate military aggression against Pakistan.

AZIZ AHMED: The Prime Minister also asked me to remind you of what you said in 1971, that you would teach them a lesson they would never forget. Now I know that positions change and that policies evolve. THE SECRETARY: Well, in practice, they are coming to us.

AZIZ AHMED: But the reverse impression has been created. The Weintraub article in the New York Times indicated that the U. S. is seeking ways to give aid to India...

THE SECRETARY: I have seen that article. We have a budding novelist in our Embassy. He is busy writing chapters for his book. We are not eager to give aid to India and I would be amazed if Congress appropriated any. It was obvious that someone was talking to Embassy people. It is a classic example of masochism. We have to prove ourselves to the Indians. Even the Indians would not be so insolent as to demand that. It is an American masochistic sense of guilt that we must perform a national duty by giving aid to India. We want to create an impression and maybe the reality of greater Indian independence. We want the Soviets to understand that they get no permenent advantage anywhere when they touch something. We have no illusions about Indian policy, but their and our purposes may be served by the illusion of better relations. There are also domestic advantages in this. Internationally there is no significance, no real change.

AZIZ AHMED: If I may say so, this is an old story. Twelve years ago we were told that you had to have better relations with India to prevent it from having closer relations with the Soviets. We think there is another way. You have to prove to the Indians the futility of arming themselves. This can only be demonstrated by indicating specifically what the U.S. will do in the event of an attack on Pakistan. This can also be demonstrated by supplying sophisticated arms to Pakistan. Then the Indians will realize it is futile to build up its arms.

THE SECRETARY: My going to India makes it easier to do something for Pakistan. Our problem is... It is essential that you see the President while you are here. He has already seen Swaran Singh.

AZIZ AHMED: There is another aspect. The prospect of better Sino-Indian relations.

THE SECRETARY: We favor that, but the Indian action in Sikkim does not help.

AZIZ AHMED: The Chinese have told us that if the Indians implement their agreement with us and Pakistan is satisfied, China will improve its relations with India. When we were in Peking, the Deputy Prime Minister said publicly at the banquet that China was ready for close and friendly relations with India. A week later - the bomb. That was a setback. And now Sikkim. Nepal and Bhutan are worried. Nepal is terribly worried. China is going to see that nothing happens to Nepal or Bhutan.

THE SECRETARY: We have no great illusions about India. Perhaps that is the difference from 12 years ago. For us, the arms question is not an intellectual problem. In 1971 I did not understand how people in this government interpreted the President's orders on third-country transfers when we imposed the embargo on Pakistan. No one explained to me that it would hurt Pakistan more than India. The Government was pro-Pakistan at that time, but the bureaucracy was pro-India. To some extent that has changed now with the Indian bomb. The bureaucracy is anti-proliferation. My people will do anything but run foreign policy. I am less outraged by the Indian bomb than some. I see it as a trap for India. They will never be able to use it in practice. And if the bomb spreads, it will equalize India's military superiority.

AZIZ AHMED: The French say the same thing but I do not agree. If the Indian army were in difficulty they would use the nuclear bomb in desperation as a last resort.

THE SECRETARY: They would lose the war first and very badly in my opinion. Will you beat them?

AZIZ AHMED: We can if we have arms. But we're not planning to do that. We just want enough to defend ourselves against India and Afghanistan who are being supported by the Soviet Union.

THE SECRETARY: I have seen figures on the Afghanistan buildup. After elections I'll raise the arms question again. And you raise it when you see the President. [The Secretary then suggested to Mr. Oakley that the meeting with the President be arranged for Saturday, October 5.] It will be better if I am there.

AZIZ AHMED: For the last three years we have been left to fend for ourselves.

THE SECRETARY: I know. I am beginning to despair about domestic attitudes. Congress is now attacking Turkey, another ally. However, the mood is shifting on India.

AZIZ AHMED: What about the mood on arms for Pakistan?

THE SECRETARY: As I told you the last time that we met, we will work on the cash sales first. But there will be a massive problem. Somebody leaks even our internal papers on this. This is a happy little group.

AZIZ AHMED: When it happens, there will be a big noise from the Indians.

THE SECRETARY: Are you buying from the French?

AZIZ AHMED: We are buying some missiles, but the French are holding back deliveries for two to four years. Unfortunately I was here when the agreement was signed. We want them now, not in two to four years. The French are slick businessmen, they keep pushing us back. Our negotiators quietly accepted their terms.

THE SECRETARY: I know of no Pakistani who quietly accepts reverses. Someone asked me how many Pakistanis would be able to carry out the mediation in Cyprus. I said you would be able to do it, and you are welcome to take over. But I would advise you to stay out. I'd like to get out. The Greeks have a new formula for negotiations: riots, attack me in the press and then invite me in. I said I would wait two more weeks.

AZIZ AHMED: The Greeks invited Prime Minister Bhutto to mediate and then posed unacceptable conditions for a settlement. We bought three Breguet-Atlantique aircraft from the French. If we had had them in 1971, we could have destroyed the Indian OSA's which attacked Karachi in the middle of the night. The French gave us half-price on the aircraft - 38 million francs - but with the service and modifications the total price was 220 million francs. They are not only fleecing us, but also skinning us. The Croatale missiles increased from 200 to 350 million francs by the time we reached agreement. They know we have nowhere else to go and they exploit us.

THE SECRETARY: How about Iran?

AZIZ AHMED: We don't know. They have offered to help us in the dieselization of our tanks.

THE SECRETARY: Yes. We helped on that.

AZIZ AHMED: We have suggested to the Iranians cross-training of our people on their equipment, but they are reluctant on that. We have had no training on their equipment.

THE SECRETARY: Would you like me to raise that with the Shah?

AZIZ AHMED: No. We don't want him to know that we complained. He has been very good to us.

THE SECRETARY: Why not? I will see him alone on my trip. We have a very good relationship.

AZIZ AHMED: If war, God forbid, should come, we only want equipment from Iran, not troops. The Shah talks in sweeping terms of support, but we don't know specifically what it would be.

THE SECRETARY: Even against Afghanistan?

AZIZ AHMED: Yes, against Afghanistan. The most we could hope for would be the transfer of equipment if we saw war coming.

THE SECRETARY: Their Air Force could help.

AZIZ AHMED: We would only want their equipment but that requires training.

THE SECRETARY: Let me talk to the Shah. What are you doing on the Cambodian Resolution?

AZIZ AHMED: What is it?

THE SECRETARY: One resolution would expel the Cambodians. We want deferral of the issue for one year.

AZIZ AHMED: We will look into it, with your views in mind.

THE SECRETARY: How is the Prime Minister?

AZIZ AHMED: Fine. He has been touring the northern areas. We picked up Hunza, but there is no change in our stand on Jammu and Kashmir. Hunza will be a directly administered area. We could not leave it with the Mir of Hunza. On another matter I want to bring up. In spite of the promises made by oil producers, we have not had much help. They say that balance of payments assistance is against their policy. The Saudis have provided $100 million in loans for four projects - $50 million now and the rest in two years. Our oil deficit is $200 million. We have $150 million in a loan from Iran and will get another $50 million from the Saudis. We are even on the deficit, but this increases our debt and we will have problems in years ahead. We are in difficulty on wheat and vegetable oil. We appreciate your problems.

THE SECRETARY: Have any arrangements been made for wheat for Pakistan?

MR. ATHERTON: We have made recommendation for the second quarter but no action has been taken as yet.

AZIZ AHMED: The word is around that Pakistan is better off than India or Bangladesh and that Pakistan is not the most severely hit. Well, we are better off than India and Bangladesh, but not so well off as to get nothing. We have a difficult problem with wheat. We had hoped to be even this year, but because of bad weather and too optimistic forecasting, we find we have a deficit of 1.1 million tons.

THE SECRETARY: We insist on a high priority for Pakistan in our internal discussions on food assistance. We have lots of problems with other departments, with Agriculture which wants a medium-sized allocation, and OMB which wants a low allocation. There is concern over the effect on our food prices. But I hope we will have a decision on the second quarter before you come down to see the President. We will be sympathetic. We will not be able to give you all you want, but we will be very sympathetic. We'll let you know.

AZIZ AHMED: We have imported 650,000 tons from our own resources.

THE SECRETARY: On food we can't do everything but we'll do something. I saw Mujib today for the first time. He keeps talking about "my oil, my people, my food". He said he wants some assets from Pakistan.

AZIZ AHMED: When Bhutto visited Dacca, Mujib said he wanted immediate agreement on 56 percent of Pakistan's ships and planes. Bhutto told him he could not make an immediate decision, because he is accountable to his people in Parliament. Kamal Hossain talked to me later and forced me to say that when the liabilities and assets are counted, the balance may be against Bangladesh. I told him not to be too anxious for a full accounting.

THE SECRETARY: Mujib said he will explain the whole situation to me. I have never been to Dacca before. He wants you to take 67,000 families of Biharis.

AZIZ AHMED: Mujib's position is sheer cussedness and vindictiveness. I have been told by a diplomat in Bangladesh that it is extraordinary to see the jute mills running at half capacity, while outside the mills there are Biharis in camps. They won't employ them, even though they have the skills to run the mills.

THE SECRETARY: Why don't you want them?

AZIZ AHMED: We have debated this at length. The Sind already has a high proportion of non-Sindhis. There is a delicate political balance.

THE SECRETARY: Who are the non-Sindhis?

AZIZ AHMED: They are refugees from India. There was a massive move to Karachi at partition. We took 150,000 non-Bengalees and we tried to spread them around the country. But once they come, they drift to Karachi.

THE SECRETARY: Because the employment is there?

AZIZ AHMED: Yes. Mr. Bhutto says that he doesn't believe in provincialism, but he has to take it into account. He explained this to Mujib. We have offered to set up a commission on assets that would report its conclusions within six months. On the Biharis, after good relations are established and there is some movement in our relations, maybe the problem can be resolved quietly. But Mujib said no.

THE SECRETARY: I will see you in Washington and then later in Islamabad.

MR. ATHERTON: The press may want to know after this meeting what you have discussed.

THE SECRETARY: Say that we had very warm talks.

AZIZ AHMED: Can you say "in the context of our special relationship"?

THE SECRETARY: Let us say that we had warm talks in the context of our very special friendship.

AZIZ AHMED: That's fine.

THE SECRETARY: We are very conscious of your needs on arms. On food we will try to move very fast.

For more documents on US policy on Bharat-Pakistan crisis in 1971 please go to "India and Pakistan: Crisis and War, March-December 1971".


For more official information about President Nixon's views about Bharat please go to "Second Chronological Conversation Tape Release" and its home page.

You can also listen to Nixon's White House tapes online. Here is one of the Tape Conversation Number 624-21 on November 24, 1971. Its official abstract is

"The President, Henry Kissinger and Secretary of State William Rogers change the US government policy of neutrality in the India-Pakistan War and secretly "tilt" toward Pakistan."

The Nixon Library has almost 50 million pages of documents and is working toward making more of this massive collection available to the researcher via the Internet. Here are some of the Documents online.

Some of the important Tape Subject Logs for the above mentioned important conversations including the ones in which Nixon-Kissinger abused Bharatvaasi and Indira Nehru Gandhi can be read online: Oval #583: September 29, 1971, Oval #615: November 5, 1971, Oval #615: November 5, 1971 and Oval #624: November 24, 1971.

You can also go to "White House Tapes Finding Aids" for more help.

This is how pseudo-secular Pro-Congress Muslim-Rightist section of Bharatiya media reported these revelations: Old witch Indira’ll go to war: Nixon-Kissinger by Indian Express on June 29, 2005